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Abstract
Malware scanners try to protect users from opening malicious docu-
ments by statically or dynamically analyzing documents. However,
malware developers may apply evasions that conceal the malicious-
ness of a document. Given the variety of existing evasions, systemat-
ically assessing the impact of evasions onmalware scanners remains
an open challenge. This paper presents a novel methodology for
testing the capability of malware scanners to cope with evasions.
We apply the methodology to malicious Portable Document Format
(PDF) documents and present an in-depth study of how current PDF
evasions affect 41 state-of-the-art malware scanners. The study is
based on a framework for creating malicious PDF documents that
use one or more evasions. Based on such documents, we measure
how effective different evasions are at concealing the maliciousness
of a document. We find that many static and dynamic scanners can
be easily fooled by relatively simple evasions and that the effec-
tiveness of different evasions varies drastically. Our work not only
is a call to arms for improving current malware scanners, but by
providing a large-scale corpus of malicious PDF documents with
evasions, we directly support the development of improved tools
to detect document-based malware. Moreover, our methodology
paves the way for a quantitative evaluation of evasions in other
kinds of malware.
1 INTRODUCTION
Malware scanners, or shortly scanners, are software tools that
detect malicious files, or in brief, malware. Two common types of
scanners are static and dynamic scanners. Static scanners reason
about a file by examining its content without actually running it.
In contrast, dynamic scanners examine the behavior of a file at
run-time, either by executing it (e.g. Windows executable), or by
opening it in the appropriate application (e.g. Adobe Reader for
PDF files) or an emulator of such an application.
Perhaps as old as the emergence of scanners [60] are evasions,
which are used by attackers to circumvent scanners. Also known
as “logic bombs” in earlier work [28], evasions try to fool scanners
through a variety of static techniques, such as code obfuscation, and
dynamic techniques, such as checking the run-time environment
to behave benignly when the environment appears to be a scanner.
The ultimate goal is the same across all evasions: bypass the scanner,
while preserving the infection capabilities of the file to compromise
the victim’s security.
As scanners are constantly improving their abilities to detect
malware, evasion techniques are evolving aswell. To bypassmodern
defenses that deploy both static and dynamic analysis, attackers
may combine evasions, which can lead to side-effects that have to
be assessed. Vendors of malware scanners must keep fighting new
evasion techniques and their combinations, just like new attacks.
It is therefore crucial for vendors to understand which evasions to
address first and how evasions and their combinations impact their
scanners.
In this work we present a systematic methodology to quantita-
tively study and compare evasions. The methodology is applicable
to any type of malware and their corresponding scanners. The main
goal of the methodology is to determine how effective evasions are,
or to put inversely, how effective scanners are despite the presence
of evasions. In addition, the methodology allows for measuring
unintended side-effects of an evasion, e.g., turning an undetected
file into a detected one, and for measuring the effect of combining
multiple evasions.
We use ourmethodology to study evasions for PDF files. Document-
based malware attacks are a prevailing problem [3, 29, 52]. These
attacks use email or web traffic to deliver malicious documents to
victim systems. Then they compromise the system’s security by
exploiting a vulnerability in the document processing application
(e.g., a PDF exploit) or by using legitimate features of the document
processing application itself (e.g., embedding an executable file).
The attacker’s goal is to execute arbitrary machine code or code in a
powerful language supported by the client applications (e.g., Visual
Basic scripts for Office files). As most organizations need to be able
to receive or download files in different document formats, these
attacks are particularly difficult to prevent compared to attacks
that use executable file formats only. Yet, malicious documents
are as powerful as malicious executables because they can lead to
arbitrary code execution.
Unfortunately, despite the widespread use of document files
and works that study their evasions [8, 12, 20, 46, 66, 75, 78], little
is currently known about the effectiveness of document evasion
techniques, their combinations, and the dependence of evasion ef-
fectiveness on other malware components, such as the exploit used
by a malicious document. Using our methodology, we study evasion
techniques for PDFs and evaluate their effectiveness in bypassing
state-of-the-art PDF scanners. To this end, we develop a novel
framework, called Chameleon, that enriches existing malicious PDF
documents with one or more evasions. Chameleon automatically
creates PDF exploits with evasions and validates whether the gener-
ated exploits work successfully despite the evasion. Based on 1,395
documents generated by Chameleon, we study 41 widely used PDF
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scanners (34 of which are available via VirusTotal) and report a
detailed analysis of the results.
The findings of our study include the following:
• Except for one studied scanner [36], none of the 41 scanners is
immune to evasions. Each of them can be fooled by some evasions
into misclassifying a malicious document as benign. This result
is particularly surprising because the vulnerabilities exploited in
our malicious documents have been known for several years.
• There are huge variations across different scanners. While some
scanners identify most malicious documents despite evasions,
other scanners are fooled by more than 80% of all evasions.
• We identify three combinations of evasions that are particularly
dangerous as they can mislead all but two scanners.
• The attack mechanism used in a document influences the effec-
tiveness of evasions. For example, an exploit that relies only on
JavaScript can often be effectively concealed by obfuscating the
JavaScript code.
• Evasions can be easily combined in an automated way to bypass
both static and dynamic scanners.
• Evasions may have side effects and can become counterproduc-
tive bymaking scanners suddenly detect an otherwise undetected
malicious document.
The results of this study are relevant for several groups of peo-
ple. First, our methodology will help researchers to study and rank
evasions by their effectiveness in a consistent manner. Moreover,
our study sheds light on the anti-evasion problems that state-of-
the-art document scanners suffer from. Second, vendors of security
scanners, e.g., anti-virus or sandbox solution vendors, can learn
and use our findings to further harden their solutions against eva-
sion techniques. Third, users and organizations that need to defend
themselves against malware attacks obtain a better understanding
of how effective their deployed security solutions are, particularly
for PDF-based attacks. We believe that publicly sharing the knowl-
edge about evasions and their effectiveness is the best step toward
effectively mitigating potential attacks. In addition, we are closely
collaborating with vendors of scanners to make them aware of their
current weaknesses.
In summary, we make the following contributions:
• Evasion assessment methodology: We propose a methodol-
ogy to quantitatively study the effectiveness of evasions on a
large scale. This methodology can be used for all types of malware
and their corresponding scanners.
• Chameleon framework:We implement our methodology for
PDF exploits in Chameleon, a novel framework that automatically
transforms malicious PDF documents into evasive documents.
• A benchmark test suite: We make a corpus of 1,395 evasive
PDF files generated by Chameleon publicly available, to foster
future work on evaluating and improving PDF security scanners.
• An in-depth study of evasions for document-based mal-
ware:We conduct a large-scale study of the effectiveness of 19
PDF evasions on a set of 41 scanners. Our findings show widely
used scanners to be easily fooled by evasions, motivating work
on better-coping with evasions.
2 A METHODOLOGY FOR ASSESSING
EVASIONS
To study the anti-evasion capabilities of malware scanners, we
present a generic methodology to study evasions and their effect on
scanners. The methodology is designed to address a set of research
questions presented in Section 2.1. To address these questions, we
define several metrics that measure how evasions influence the
outcome of malware scanners (Section 2.2). Our methodology as-
sumes that possibly malicious files are analyzed by scanners, and
that these files may contain evasions. File here means any type
of file ranging from executables (e.g., Android apps) to document
files (e.g., Office documents). Scanner here means a software tool
that classifies a file either as malicious or as benign. Finally, eva-
sion refers to a technique aimed at concealing the fact that a file is
malicious.
2.1 Research Questions
We focus on the following research questions (RQs):
• RQ1: How accurately do the scanners classify malicious and
benign files in the presence of evasions?
• RQ2:How effective are the evasions at fooling specific scanners?
• RQ3:Which evasions are most effective?
• RQ4: Do some evasions have the opposite of the expected effect,
i.e., do they cause scanners to detect malicious files that are
missed otherwise?
• RQ5:Are there combinations of evasions that are harder to detect
than the individual evasions?
• RQ6: Does the effectiveness of an evasion depend on the exploit
or the payload used in a malicious file?
2.2 Metrics for Assessing Evasions
To address the above questions, we define several metrics. For
illustration, consider the set of example files in Table 1. There
are two single evasions, called e1 and e2, and one evasion that
is a combination of the two, called e1,2. Lines 1–16 in the table
represent malicious files. Each malicious file is based on an exploit,
a payload, and optionally, also an evasion. The last two lines of the
table represent two benign files without any payload, exploit, or
evasion. For each file, the table shows if two (hypothetical) scanners
classify the file as malicious or benign.
For a set E of evasions, a set S of scanners, and a set F of malicious
files, we use the notation f e for a file f ∈ F that uses an evasion
e ∈ E. The function mal : S × F → Boolean indicates whether a
scanner classifies a given file as malicious. Inversely, the notation
¬mal(s, f ) means that a scanner s classifies a file f as benign. For
a set Fben of benign files that do not contain any payload, exploit,
or evasion, and a set F of malicious files from a set of payloads,
optionally a set of exploits, and a set E of evasions, we define the
following formulas to measure scanners’ performance in dealing
with evasions.
Recall and false positive ratio.We evaluate a scanner’s accu-
racy in distinguishing malicious from benign files by measuring
recall and false positive (FP) ratio.
Table 1: Example files to illustrate the metrics.
# Evasion Exploit Payload Scanner outcome
s1 s2
1 – x1 p1 malicious benign
2 – x1 p2 malicious benign
3 – x2 p1 malicious malicious
4 – x2 p2 malicious malicious
5 e1 x1 p1 malicious malicious
6 e1 x1 p2 malicious malicious
7 e1 x2 p1 malicious benign
8 e1 x2 p2 malicious benign
9 e2 x1 p1 benign benign
10 e2 x1 p2 benign benign
11 e2 x2 p1 malicious benign
12 e2 x2 p2 malicious benign
13 e1,2 x1 p1 benign malicious
14 e1,2 x1 p2 benign malicious
15 e1,2 x2 p1 benign malicious
16 e1,2 x2 p2 benign malicious
17 – – – benign benign
18 – – – malicious benign
Definition 1 (Recall). Given a scanner s and a set F of malicious
files, the recall of s is:
recall(s, F ) = |{ f ∈ F | mal(s, f )}||F |
The FP ratio is computed for each scanner s on a set Fben of
benign files. Here we use benign files only, because these are the
files where a scannermightmislead users by erroneously classifying
a file as malicious.
Definition 2 (FP ratio). Given a scanner s and a set Fben of
benign files, the FP ratio of s is:
FP ratio(s, Fben ) =
|{ f ∈ Fben | mal(s, f )}|
|Fben |
For the example files in Table 1, recall and FP ratio are as follows.
recall(s1) = 1016 = 0.625 recall(s2) = 816 = 0.5
FP ratio(s1) = 12 = 0.5 FP ratio(s2) = 02 = 0.0
Effectiveness of evasions.We measure the success of an eva-
sion in bypassing a scanner for a set of malicious files. Intuitively,
we compare the outcome of a scanner for each file with an evasion
to the outcome of the scanner for the exact same file without the
evasion.
Definition 3 (Evasion effectiveness). Given a scanner s and
a set F of malicious files, the effectiveness of an evasion e is:
eff (e, s, F ) = |{ f ∈ F | mal(s, f ) ∧ ¬mal(s, f
e )}|
|{ f ∈ F | mal(s, f )}|
If the scanner does not classify any file as malicious, which would
lead to a division by zero, the effectiveness is defined to be zero.
For example, to compute the effectiveness of e1 in Table 1, we
compare row 5 with row 1, row 6 with row 2, row 7 with row 3, and
row 8 with row 4. As a result, the effectiveness for the two scanners
s1 and s2 is:
eff (e1, s1, F ) = 04 = 0.0 eff (e1, s2, F ) = 22 = 1.0
We summarize the effectiveness of evasions across multiple scan-
ners by computing the arithmetic mean of the effectiveness values
across these scanners.
For the running example in Table 1, the evasion effectiveness for
scanners S = {s1, s2} is calculated as follows:
eff (e1, {s1, s2}, F ) = 0.0 + 1.02 = 0.5
eff (e2, {s1, s2}, F ) =
2
4 +
2
2
2 = 0.75
eff (e1,2, {s1, s2}, F ) =
4
4 +
0
2
2 = 0.5
Likewise, to summarize the effectiveness across a set of evasions,
we average effectiveness values across the set. For the evasions
E = {e1, e2, e1,2} in the example we have:
eff ({e1, e2, e1,2}, {s1, s2}, F ) = 0.5 + 0.75 + 0.53 ≈ 0.58
Counter-effectiveness: attacker’s cost of using evasions.
Even though the goal of an evasion is to bypass the detection of a
scanner, an evasion may also have the opposite effect: to cause a
scanner mark a file as malicious that otherwise would be marked as
benign. We call an evasion that has such an effect counter-effective.
Definition 4 (Evasion counter-effectiveness). Given a scan-
ner s and a set F of malicious files, the counter-effectiveness of an
evasion e is:
counterEff (e, s, F ) = |{ f ∈ F | ¬mal(s, f ) ∧mal(s, f
e )}|
|{ f ∈ F | ¬mal(s, f )}|
For example, for the evasions in Table 1 we have:
counterEff (e1, {s1, s2}, F ) =
0
0 +
2
2
2 = 0.5
counterEff (e2, {s1, s2}, F ) =
0
0 +
0
2
2 = 0.0
counterEff (e1,2, {s1, s2}, F ) =
0
0 +
2
2
2 = 0.5
From the attacker’s perspective, another cost of using evasions
is that they may interfere with the malicious behavior of a file. For
example, an evasion in a PDF document that requires the user to
move the mouse before the malicious behavior is triggered may
not only hide the maliciousness but also reduce the chance that the
attack is successful. One way of measuring this cost would be to
conduct a user study that measures how often a file with an evasion
successfully triggers the attack when the file is handled by users.
We leave the challenge of measuring this cost for future work.
Added effectiveness by combining evasions. A set E of eva-
sions that is combined in a file adds to the effectiveness of the
individual evasions in E only if E is effective but none of the subsets
of E are effective. We formalize this idea in the following metric.
Definition 5 (Evasion added effectiveness). Given a scanner
s and a set F of malicious files, the added effectiveness of a combined
evasion e is:
addedEff (e, s, F ) =
|{ f ∈ F | mal(s, f ) ∧ ¬mal(s, f e ) ∧ ∄e ′ ⊂ e . ¬mal(s, f e ′)}|
|{ f ∈ F | mal(s, f ) ∧ ¬mal(s, f e )}|
where e ′ ⊂ e refers to the single or combined evasions that constitute
e .
For example in Table 1, the added effectiveness of e1,2, which is
composed of e1 and e2, is:
addedEff (e1,2, s1, F ) = 24 = 0.5
addedEff (e1,2, s2, F ) = 00 = 0.0
Dependence of evasions on other components of a mal-
ware. To study how the effectiveness depends on other malware
components, e.g., its payload or exploit, Definition 3 can be applied
to subsets of all files that have that particular component in com-
mon. For example, to study how the effectiveness depends on the
exploit used in a malicious PDF file, effectiveness is computed on
the subset of all PDF files under study that are based on that very
exploit. In Table 1, to focus on those files that use exploit x2, we
consider only the set of files Fx2 in rows 3, 4, 7, 8, 11, 12, 15, and 16.
The effectiveness of evasion e1 w.r.t. these files across all scanners
is:
eff (e1, {s1, s2}, Fx2 ) =
0
2 +
2
2
2 = 0.5
The set of metrics defined above allows us to address the research
questions given in Section 2.1. In particular, Definitions 1 and 2
address RQ1, Definition 3 addresses RQ2–3 and RQ6, Definition 4
addresses RQ4, and Definition 5 addresses RQ5.
3 CHAMELEON FRAMEWORK: GENERATING
MALICIOUS, EVASIVE PDFS
Our study is based on various evasions, which we summarize in
a taxonomy (Section 3.1). To systematically study how these eva-
sions evade malware scanners, we present Chameleon, a framework
to automatically create malicious files that contain one or more
evasions. Our implementation of the framework focuses on ma-
licious PDF documents. Such malware is particularly interesting
because document-based malware attacks are a prevailing prob-
lem [3, 29, 52] and because the ability of PDF scanners to cope with
evasions is currently understudied.
Figure 1 shows an overview of the Chameleon framework. The
inputs to the framework are a set of evasions, a set of exploits, i.e.,
code that uses a bug or vulnerability, and a set of payloads, i.e., code
that contains the malicious behavior of the attack. We discuss these
inputs in Sections 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3, respectively. Given these inputs,
Chameleon generates evasive PDF documents and validates that
they still behave maliciously despite the evasion(s). We then pass
these documents to a set of PDF scanners (Section 4) and measure
their ability to handle the evasions (Section 5).
3.1 Evasions
Various evasion techniques, for executables and other potentially
malicious file formats have been proposed [1, 16, 22, 35, 39, 42, 53,
69]. To provide some background on different kinds of evasions and
the scope of this work, we present a taxonomy of evasions. The tax-
onomy tries to cover the major classes of evasions that are relevant
for malicious documents without claiming to be complete. In par-
ticular, we focus on evasions implemented in high-level languages
Evasive 
documents
Exploits
1. Generate
Payloads
Evasions
2. Validate Malicious 
documents
Malicious 
or benign
Chameleon framework
4. Assess
3. Scan
Evasion 
effectiveness, 
etc.
Scanners
Figure 1: Overview of the Chameleon framework and its
four steps.
that can be embedded into document formats, such as JavaScript
and Visual Basic.
Figure 2 shows an overview of the taxonomy. We distinguish
between dynamic and static evasions. Static evasions attempt to
modify the document or the code embedded into it in a way that
influences a static analysis of the document. In contrast, dynamic
evasions change the run-time behavior of a document to influence
the outcome of a dynamic analysis of the document.
3.1.1 Static Evasions. Among the static evasions, there are two
broad classes. First, run-time loading tries to conceal malicious
behavior by loading parts of the code at run-time, making it harder
for a static scanner to detect the maliciousness. For example, an
evasion based on run-time loading may download the malicious
payload once the document is opened on the victim’s machine, i.e.,
after having been checked by a static scanner. Second, obfuscation
modifies the malicious source code to conceal its purpose. There
are various obfuscation techniques, such as encryption, multi-pass
encoding, logical xor, and changing the code structure [35].
3.1.2 Dynamic Evasions. Dynamic evasions can be broadly classi-
fied into three categories. The first category are environment-based
evasions, which attempt to take the execution environment into
account. This approach is specially appealing for targeted attacks,
where the attacker has some information about the target system.
We further classify environment-based evasions into the following
five categories:
Network. Dynamic scanners may restrict the network access
of documents to prevent malware from downloading its payload.
Network-based evasions check the network connection to identify
the presence of a dynamic scanner or a sandbox.
File system. Since many dynamic scanners rely on known li-
braries or executables, the presence of particular files in the file
system may disclose a dynamic scanner. File system-based evasions
check whether particular files exist to decide whether to perform
any malicious behavior.
Evasions
Dynamic
Random &
Time-based
UI
MachineHuman
Environment
ArchitectureTimingContextFile SystemNetwork
Static
ObfuscationRun-time
Loading
Figure 2: A taxonomy of evasion techniques.
Context. Information about the system language, locales, most
recently used documents, the time zone, etc. can be abused by
attackers to target particular victim systems [43, 58]. A context-
based evasion deceives dynamic scanners by behaving maliciously
only in particular contexts.
Timing. Due to the virtualized environment used by most dy-
namic scanners, some operations have observably lower perfor-
mance than other operations. For example, the performance differ-
ence of a CPU-intensive computation and a GPU-intensive compu-
tation is higher in a virtual machine than on a physical machine.
The reason is that in a modern virtual machine, many CPU instruc-
tions run natively, whereas translating GPU instructions to physical
instructions imposes a noticeable overhead [33]. Timing-based eva-
sions exploit such differences in execution time to determine the
presence of a dynamic scanner [7].
Architecture. These evasions recognize architectural idiosyn-
crasies of the underlying physical or virtual machine. Examples
include an incorrectly return value of the CPUID instruction in
QEMU [25] and GPU fingerprinting [11].
The second category of dynamic evasions are UI-based evasions.
Such evasions monitor interactions with UI elements to determine
whether a human or a machine is using the system. We further
classify UI-based evasions into two sub-classes:
Human user. These evasions attempt to identify a human user
and expose the malicious behavior only to such users. For example,
an evasion may wait until the user scrolls to a particular page or
clicks a particular UI element [70].
Machine user. Instead of trying to detect a human user, an eva-
sion may also check for evidences that a machine is interacting
with the system. For example, text entered into a form with a su-
perhuman typing speed or clicks on an invisible element suggests
the presence of a machine user [37].
The third category of dynamic evasions are random-based and
time-based evasions. This kind of evasion triggers an attack either
probabilistically or depending on the current time, e.g., only on
specific times of the day [17].
3.1.3 Implementation of Evasions. Based on our taxonomy, we have
implemented 19 evasions (7 static and 12 dynamic), as summarized
in Table 2. Some evasions take an argument to configure different
variants of the evasion. For example, the “lang” evasion can be
configured by passing the language to check for, and the “delay”
evasion can be configured with a specific amount of time. Using
the “lang” evasion with “English” as the argument will result in a
document that attacks only computers with the English version of
Adobe Reader:
if (app.language == "English")
exploit(); // trigger the exploit
In addition to injecting individual evasions into documents,
Chameleon also allows to blend multiple evasions into combined
evasions. We refer to combined evasions that contain at least one
static and at least one dynamic evasion as hybrid evasions. When
combining evasions of the same kind, we focus on evasions from
different classes, e.g., run-time loading with JavaScript obfuscation.
For UI-based evasions, we also combine several evasions from the
same class to gradually increase the complexity of the UI interac-
tions required to trigger the attack. Moreover, Chameleon creates
an evasion that combines several context-based evasions, to create
a document that targets a very specific environment and remains
silent otherwise.
3.2 Exploits
Chameleon uses two PDF exploit modules provided by the Metas-
ploit framework1 and adapts them to introduce evasions. The “Tool-
button” exploit2 abuses a use-after-free vulnerability in the imple-
mentation of the Adobe-specific JavaScript function app.addTool-
Button. The exploit executes some JavaScript code to set up the
environment and then triggers the vulnerability by calling the vul-
nerable function. To implement dynamic evasions, we trigger the
vulnerability only if the condition checked by the evasion holds.
The “Cooltype” exploit3 uses a malicious font file in addition to
malicious JavaScript code. The font file is loaded after the JavaScript
code has set up the environment for exploitation.We slightlymodify
the exploit by adding an exploitation trigger that controls whether
and when the exploit is executed. The dynamic evasions call this
trigger only if the condition checked by evasion holds.
In addition to “Toolbutton” and “Cooltype”, Metasploit provides
other PDF exploit modules. We choose these two exploits as they
target a popular PDF reader software (Adobe Reader) and because
they are old and well-known. If our evasions can fool PDF scanners
using old and well-studied exploits then the evasions are at least
as or even more effective when applied to more recent or zero-day
exploits.
3.3 Payloads
Another important component of any attack is the payload that it
carries. As payloads, Chameleon uses native machine code that is
executed after the vulnerability is triggered. We use three different
payloads, two provided by Metasploit and one that we develop
ourselves. The first payload, “Reverse Bind”, establishes a TCP
1https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework
2CVE-2013-3346
3CVE-2010-2883
Table 2: Static and dynamic evasions implemented in the Chameleon framework. The last columndenoteswhether the evasion
is implemented in the PDF structure, the embedded JavaScript code, or both.
Class Name Description Implementation
Static evasions:
Run-time load-
ing
steganography Encode the JavaScript code into an image file embedded in the PDF document. Load and eval the
code at run-time.
PDF & JavaScript
content Store the JavaScript code as the content in the PDF document. Load and eval the code at run-time. PDF & JavaScript
JavaScript
obfuscation
rev Lexically reverse the JavaScript code. JavaScript
xor Encode the JavaScript code by applying the bitwise xor operator with the specified key. JavaScript
PDF
obfuscation
objstm Compress the malicious PDF as an Object Stream and put it into a benign PDF document. PDF
nest Recursively embed the malicious PDF into a benign PDF document for one or more times. PDF
decoy Insert the malicious JavaScript code into a benign PDF document. In contrast to “nest”, this evasion
does not recursively nest documents into each other.
PDF
Dynamic evasions:
Context lang Trigger if the language of the PDF viewer is in the specified set of languages. JavaScript
resol Trigger if the desktop resolution is in the specified range. JavaScript
mons Trigger if the user’s computer has the specified number of monitors attached to it. JavaScript
filename Trigger if the generated exploit’s filename has not changed. Some scanners change the filename
before the analysis.
JavaScript
UI scroll Trigger when the user has scrolled to the specified page. PDF
captcha Trigger if the user’s text input matches the specified string. JavaScript
alert_three Show an alert dialog box with three buttons and trigger if the specified button is clicked. JavaScript
doc_close Trigger when the document gets closed. PDF
alert_one Show an alert dialog box with one button and trigger when the button is clicked. JavaScript
mouse Trigger if the mouse position changes. JavaScript
Random and
time-based
delay Delay the exploitation for the given amount of time (time bomb). JavaScript
tod Trigger at the specified time of the day. JavaScript
connection to a remote host allowing the remote host to control
the exploited machine. The second payload, “Powershell”, spawns
an instance of Windows Powershell with a command that creates a
text file in a temporary directory. The third payload, “Exit”, simply
exits the Adobe Reader process.
3.4 Generating and Validating Evasive
Documents
We implement the Generate step of Chameleon on top of the Metas-
ploit framework, which we use to generate exploit documents, and
the Origami PDF transformation library4, which we use to ma-
nipulate documents. The 19 evasions are implemented as a new
Metasploit module, which can be used with any of the PDF exploit
modules.
After generating a supposedly malicious document, Chameleon
checks that the document is indeed malicious (step Validate). To
this end, Chameleon opens the document in the vulnerable version
of Adobe Reader inside a sandbox, interacts with it according to
the evasions (e.g., by moving the mouse or waiting for some time),
and checks whether the payload is executed. At the moment this
process is mostly but not fully automated because for context-based
evasions, the sandbox needs to be manually adapted to the context
that an evasion is looking for (e.g., for the “mons” evasion, the
number of displays attached to the sandbox has to be properly set).
4https://github.com/gdelugre/origami
Our implementation and a set of 1,395 generated PDF documents
are publicly available.5
4 PDF SCANNERS
We study 36 static and 5 dynamic scanners, including both academic
and widely used commercial tools, as listed in Table 3. To categorize
a scanner as static or dynamic we rely on information provided by
the vendors or developers. Based on this information, we consider a
scanner as static if it reasons about a PDF document without open-
ing the document in a PDF viewer. In contrast, dynamic scanners
open a PDF document in a PDF viewer or an emulator and then
analyze its runtime behavior, e.g., by tracking how the PDF viewer
interacts with the operating system. Our study includes more static
than dynamic scanners because static scanners are more common
in practice.
To run the commercial static scanners on our PDF documents,
we use the application programming interface (API) of VirusTotal
that runs close to 60 static scanners at once on a given document.
We ignore those scanners that do not detect any of the exploits we
use (perhaps because they are not designed to detect PDF malware),
which leaves 34 commercial static scanners. To run the commer-
cial dynamic scanners, we use the individual APIs provided by the
respective vendors of these scanners. The vendors of two com-
mercial dynamic scanners requested to participate anonymously,
so we refer to them as DS1 and DS2. Appendix A.1 explains the
detailed setup of the non-commercial scanners. In addition to the
5https://github.com/sola-da/Chameleon/
Table 3: PDF scanners used for the study.
Scanner Static Dynamic Academic Commercial
ALYac ✓ ✓
AVG ✓ ✓
AVware ✓ ✓
Ad-Aware ✓ ✓
AhnLab-V3 ✓ ✓
Antiy-AVL ✓ ✓
Arcabit ✓ ✓
Avast ✓ ✓
Avira ✓ ✓
Baidu ✓ ✓
BitDefender ✓ ✓
CAT-QuickHeal ✓ ✓
Cuckoo ✓ ✓ ✓
Cyren ✓ ✓
DS1 ✓ ✓
DS2 ✓ ✓
Emsisoft ✓ ✓
F-Prot ✓ ✓
F-Secure ✓ ✓
Fortinet ✓ ✓
GData ✓ ✓
Ikarus ✓ ✓
Jiangmin ✓ ✓
Kaspersky ✓ ✓
MAX ✓ ✓
McAfee-GW-Edition ✓ ✓
MicroWorld-eScan ✓ ✓
Microsoft ✓ ✓
NANO-Antivirus ✓ ✓
PDF-Scrutinizer [61] ✓ ✓
Qihoo-360 ✓ ✓
Rising ✓ ✓
SAFE-PDF [36] ✓ ✓
Slayer [47] ✓ ✓
Sophos ✓ ✓
SploitGuard ✓ ✓
Symantec ✓ ✓
Tencent ✓ ✓
TrendMicro ✓ ✓
VIPRE ✓ ✓
ZoneAlarm ✓ ✓
scanners listed in Table 3, we considered several others, including
PDFRate [63] and PJScan [41], but were unable to use them for our
study because they either were unavailable or had some issues in
our local setup (see Appendix A.2 for details).
5 RESULTS
In this section, we address the research questions from Section 2.1
by applying the methodology from Section 2.2. We apply 41 widely
used PDF scanners to a total of 1,395 malicious PDF documents
generated by the Chameleon framework and an additional 81 be-
nign PDF documents. The benign documents comprise train tickets,
governmental documents, manuals, tutorials, and some suspicious
looking PDF files that are known to be benign. All documents used
for our study will be made available as a benchmark for future
work.
5.1 RQ1: Recall and False Positives
The following addresses RQ1, i.e., how accurately the scanners
classify documents into malicious and benign in the presence of
evasions. We measure the recall and the false positive ratio of each
scanner, as described in Section 2.2. Figure 3 shows the results. A
higher recall means that the scanner is more successful in identi-
fying malicious PDF documents, despite the presence of evasions.
The figure shows that almost all studied scanners are affected by
evasions, as their recall values are lower than 100%. Furthermore,
we find a huge variation across the studied scanners: While some
scanners, e.g., SAFE-PDF and AVG, identify all or most malicious
documents despite evasions, others miss many malicious docu-
ments. Some scanners have a recall lower than 20%, showing that
they are easily bypassed by evasions.
In principle, a scanner could achieve 100% recall by labeling each
document as malicious. To address this potential problem, Figure 3
also shows the false positive ratio of each scanner. We find that
all scanners have a false positive ratio below 15%, except Cuckoo
(17.5%), Slayer (28.77%), and SAFE-PDF (34.57%). There is no strong
correlation (Pearson correlation coefficient: 36.61%) between recall
and false positive ratio. We conclude from these results that none of
the scanners tries to boost its recall at the cost of precision, which
seems reasonable as users easily drop a tool if they are overwhelmed
with spurious warnings.
5.2 RQ2: Evasion Effectiveness by Scanner
To better understand the susceptibility of the scanners to static
and dynamic evasions, we assess the effectiveness of evasions in
bypassing specific scanners (RQ2). We compute the evasion effec-
tiveness for each scanner by averaging the effectiveness across all
evasions. Figures 5a and 5b present the results for static and dy-
namic evasions, respectively. A lower value indicates that a scanner
is less susceptible to evasions. The results for the static evasions
in Figure 5a show some interesting effects. Somewhat surprisingly,
the effectiveness of 12 of the 34 VirusTotal scanners, roughly in
the middle of the figure, is exactly the same, out of which 8 have
the exact same recall, too (Figure 3). A possible explanation is that
multiple scanners rely on the same underlying decision mechanism,
e.g., because one scanner queries another scanner as part of its
decision, or because the same analysis algorithm is provided under
several brands. Previous, informal reports claim that some static
scanners share their results [67], which our results confirm.
Another interesting observation is that a dynamic, not a static,
scanner (DS2) is the most susceptible to static evasions. A compar-
ison of Figures 5a and 5b shows that DS2 is highly susceptible to
both dynamic and static evasions. This finding suggests that DS2
not only uses dynamic analysis, but also heavily relies on static
analysis techniques.
The static scanners in the right part of Figure 5b are impacted
by dynamic evasions. A likely reason is that adding an evasion
changes the signature of the PDF documents, and that the scanners
rely on these signatures.
5.3 RQ3: Most Effective Evasions
Understandingwhich evasions are most effective (RQ3) is important
both for attackers and for developers of security scanners. We
measure the effectiveness of evasions for each scanner and then
compute the average over all static and the average over all dynamic
scanners. Some evasions take arguments, e.g., the language used
by the “lang” evasion or the xor key used by the “xor” evasion. For
such evasions, we try a range of arguments and report the highest
observed effectiveness.
Figure 4 shows the results. We sort the evasions as in Table 2.
Overall, the results show that static scanners are much more sus-
ceptible to static evasions, while dynamic scanners get fooled by
dynamic evasions, which is unsurprising and confirms our classifi-
cation of evasions.
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Figure 3: Recall and false positive ratio of the studied scanners. The
dynamic scanners are marked with “D”.
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Table 4: The evasions that bypass all but two scanners. The
evasions are applied to a document in the given order.
Combined evasions
1 mouse, scroll, content, steganography, xor (key: 40)
2 alert_one, scroll, content, steganography, xor (key: 40)
3 alert_three (trigger on No or Cancel), mouse, mons (>1), file-
name, lang (German), tod (8 AM – 4 PM), scroll, content,
steganography, xor (key: 40)
Among the static evasions, those related to run-time loading and
JavaScript obfuscation are the most effective, suggesting that many
static scanners rely on checking the JavaScript code embedded into
PDFs to identify malicious behavior. The high effectiveness of many
of the static evasions is somewhat surprising given that some of
these static evasions have been known for several years [16, 21, 22].
For dynamic evasions, attackers can choose from a relatively
large set of highly effective evasions, including the two time-related
evasions, most of the context-related evasions, and some of the user
interaction-related evasions, e.g., “scroll”. In contrast, some other
UI-related evasions are only moderately effective, e.g., “mouse”.
The reason is that some of the dynamic scanners use anti-evasion
techniques, such as user interaction emulation, to counter these
evasions. For example, Cuckoo moves the mouse after opening a
document in a PDF reader to counter the “mouse” evasion [30].
To better understand highly effective evasions with their par-
ticular arguments across all scanners, Table 4 lists the evasions
that bypass all but two scanners (NANO-Antivirus and SAFE-PDF)
for at least one exploit. All the evasions presented in Table 4 are
hybrid, showing that combinations of static and dynamic evasions
are effective as they bypass both static and dynamic scanners at
the same time. Overall, the observation that three different combi-
nations of evasions can circumvent almost all scanners is alarming
and motivates future work on anti-evasion techniques.
5.4 RQ4: Counter-effective Evasions
In the following we address RQ4, i.e., whether some evasions have
the opposite of the expected effect by causing a scanner to detect
an otherwise missed malicious document. To answer the question,
we measure the counter-effectiveness of each evasion for each
scanner and then compute the average over all static scanners
and the average over all dynamic scanners. For evasions that take
parameters, we report the highest counter-effectiveness observed
across a range of values.
Figure 7 shows the counter-effectiveness of the studied evasions,
sorted as in Figure 4. Perhaps surprisingly, most evasions are, at
least sometimes, counter-effective. A likely reason is that some scan-
ners consider the changes of the document caused by the evasions
as indicators of malicious intent. For example, the context-related
evasions add some code to the document to check the current
context, and some scanners may consider this activity to be sus-
picious. In fact, all context-related and time-related evasions are
counter-effective. Furthermore, all evasions are counter-effective
for at least some static scanners, with the exception of the “steganog-
raphy” evasion. This evasion’s high effectiveness (Figure 4) and low
counter-effectiveness should concern the developers of scanners.
Although most evasions are sometimes counter-effective, the
counter-effectiveness in Figure 7 is relatively low compared to the ef-
fectiveness of evasions. Moreover, we observe counter-effectiveness
only in a relatively small subset of the studied scanners. For static
scanners, the evasions behave counter-effectively only on McAfee-
GW-Edition, Qihoo-360, and Rising. For dynamic scanners, all
counter-effective behavior that we observe is due to DS2.
5.5 RQ5: Combinations of Evasions
A combination of evasions may be more effective than the individ-
ual evasions. For example, even though some evasions may not be
able to bypass a scanner alone, their combination may be able to
do so (RQ5). In the following we discuss the added effectiveness of
combined dynamic, combined static, and hybrid evasions. Figure 8
presents the results for combined evasions with more than 0.5%
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Figure 5: Per-scanner effectiveness of static and dynamic evasions.
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Figure 6: Effectiveness of evasions for the subsets
of malicious documents that use a specific exploit.
Each bar corresponds to an evasion with a specific
argument. The hybrid evasions, and some of the
static and dynamic evasions result from combin-
ing evasions (Section 3.1.3).
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Figure 7: Counter-effectiveness for different classes of static
and dynamic evasions. The results are averaged over all
static (red) and dynamic (blue) scanners.
added effectiveness. Averaged over all scanners, the added effec-
tiveness of even the most successful combined evasions is relatively
low (about 3.2%). For some individual scanners, though, we find
higher added effectiveness values. That is, an attacker interested in
bypassing a particular scanner could combine evasions suitable for
this task.
Interestingly, combining multiple static evasions does not cause
any added effectiveness, suggesting that a single static evasion
is sufficient to fool scanners susceptible to this kind of evasion.
Furthermore, all combined dynamic evasions in Figure 8 result
from combining UI-based evasions, showing that an evasion that
requires a more complicated user interaction is more successful.
5.6 RQ6: Influence of Exploits and Payloads on
Evasion Effectiveness
The effectiveness of an evasion may depend on the specific exploit
or payload used in a malicious document. For example, consider an
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Figure 8: Evasions that have greater than 0.5% added effec-
tiveness.
exploit that relies on malicious JavaScript and therefore may be de-
tected by scanners that check the JavaScript code in a document. For
such an exploit, a JavaScript-based evasion may work particularly
well, because the evasion reduces the chance that scanners identify
the document as malicious. The following studies to what extent
the effectiveness of an evasion depends on the exploit or payload
used in the malicious document (RQ6). To this end, we compute
the effectiveness of each evasion for the subset of all documents
that use a particular exploit or payload.
5.6.1 Influence of Exploit. Figure 6a shows the evasion effective-
ness for documents with the “Toolbutton” exploit. The evasions
related to JavaScript obfuscation work particularly well, since this
exploit is based on malicious JavaScript code only, i.e., no other
objects, such as fonts or images, are needed. Many of these evasions
are greater than 80% effective. The sudden drop in the effectiveness
of static and hybrid evasions is also due to the drastically higher suc-
cess of JavaScript obfuscation-based versus PDF obfuscation-based
evasions.
The evasion effectiveness for documents based on the “Cooltype”
exploit is shown in Figure 6b. We use the same order of evasions as
in Figure 6a to enable a comparison between the two exploits. The
results show several interesting effects. First, the most effective eva-
sions for the “Toolbutton” exploit reach almost 100% effectiveness,
whereas the peak effectiveness of “Cooltype”-based documents is
only around 75%. The reason is that “Cooltype” requires both mali-
cious JavaScript code and a malicious font file to be embedded in the
PDF. As a result, none of the static evasions alone is highly effective
at hiding “Cooltype”-based documents. Second, the effectiveness
of evasions based on PDF obfuscation are higher for “Cooltype”
than for “Toolbutton” (the second half of static evasions’ bars in the
figure). This result suggests that many scanners identify the exploit
by searching for the malicious font file and thereby make those
evasions effective that change the signature of the PDF document
(and hence the signature of the embedded font file).
5.6.2 Influence of Payload. With the same approach as exploits, we
study the dependence of the evasions on the payload. We compute
the effectiveness of the subset of the samples with each of the three
payloads. In contrast to the exploits, we do not observe any major
differences in effectiveness of the evasions.
Overall, studying the influence of exploits and payloads on the
effectiveness of evasions shows that exploits and evasions may
influence each other. Developers of PDF scanners should be aware
of this influence when developing anti-evasion techniques, as an
attacker might choose suitable evasions depending on how a PDF
exploit works.
6 DISCUSSION
In this section, we discuss how security scanners can defend against
evasions (Section 6.1) and what limitations our work currently has
(Section 6.2).
6.1 Mitigating Evasions
One way to mitigate dynamic evasions is to adapt general anti-
evasion techniques from other domains to the problem of ana-
lyzing PDF documents. Several recent papers propose to load a
potentially malicious file in environments targeted at revealing
the malicious behavior of the file. For example, FuzzDroid [58],
IntelliDroid [73], and SmartDroid [79] try to cause a potentially ma-
licious Android app to reach “sensitive” API calls that would reveal
malicious behavior, such as sending an SMS to a premium number.
Adapting this technique to PDF scanners requires identifying sen-
sitive APIs in PDFs. For known exploits, such APIs may be known,
e.g., it is known that the “Toolbutton” exploit relies on calling the
app.addToolButton API. Finding sensitive APIs for previously
unknown exploits remains an open research problem. A related
technique to cope with dynamic evasions is to explore multiple
execution paths for branch decisions that depend on the environ-
ment in which a file is executed. Rozzle [40] proposes this idea for
client-side JavaScript code. Adapting their approach is a promising
direction for mitigating the environment-related dynamic evasions.
To deal with UI-related evasions, dynamic scanners could adapt
ideas used in PuppetDroid [27] and PyTrigger [26]. These approaches
record an interaction trace from a human and play it back when
loading the file under analysis to get through possible checks that
guard the attack. One of the dynamic scanners studied in this work,
Cuckoo, mitigates evasions using a simpler form of this idea: The
scanner arbitrarily moves the mouse to simulate a human user [30].
However, this mitigation technique is unlikely to work for eva-
sions that require a more complicated user interaction, such as a
“captcha”.
To identify files that behave differently in an analysis environ-
ment, some techniques compare the execution behavior of the
file in several different environments, e.g. virtual and physical [6].
Another kind of anti-evasion technique is to hide any difference
between a virtual and a physical execution environment to fool
the evasive malware [62]. Finally, to deal with the large number of
possible evasions and combinations of evasions, training machine
learning models to distinguish benign from malicious files seems
to be a worthwhile direction [16, 41, 63, 65]. The main challenge
for effectively training machine learning models is to obtain a suffi-
ciently large set of labeled data. Our framework could serve as a
generator of malicious training files that use different evasions and
combinations of evasions.
The high recall of SAFE-PDF [36], which is based on abstract
interpretation of JavaScript code embedded in PDFs, shows that
conservative program analysis may provide an effective way of
detecting malicious behavior despite evasions. The downside of
any conservative program analysis are spurious warnings, which
the relatively high false positive ratio of SAFE-PDF confirms.
6.2 Choice of Scanners
We focus on in-production, commercial security scanners because
they represent the current state-of-the-practice, and recent aca-
demic scanners because they represent the state-of-the-art. The
studied scanners contain more static than dynamic scanners be-
cause static scanners currently dominate the market. For example,
the VirusTotal service aggregates more than 60 static scanners at
the time of writing this paper [2], whereas we could find only ten
commercial dynamic scanners, out of which three consented to
participate in this research.
Our work should not be understood as a comparison of different
scanners, but rather as a comparison of each scanner’s effectiveness
before and after adding evasions. The version of the scanners used
in online aggregation services, which we use for the studied static
scanners, may differ from the full-fledged scanners, because vendors
may optimize the response time for an online service [56].
7 RELATEDWORK
Studying Evasions. Previous work has studied to what extent eva-
sions help in circumventing scanners for malware types other than
PDF. These studies consider Android [10, 23, 24, 55, 59, 80], Win-
dows executables [14, 49], and JavaScript [76]. Their measurements
focus on reporting for each evasion whether the scanners could still
detect a malicious file. Our work differs both in the methodology
and in its application. Methodologically, our study goes beyond a
single binary measure and answers additional questions, such as
the added effectiveness of combined evasions and the dependence
of evasions on other malware components, e.g., the payload. Re-
garding the application, this work is the first to provide an in-depth
study of the effectiveness of evasions for PDF-based malware.
Analysis of PDF Malware. Non-executable document formats,
such as PDF, have become one of the main vectors for delivering
malware to victims [32]. To detect PDF documents that contain ma-
licious JavaScript code, combinations of static and dynamic analysis
of the embedded JavaScript code search for suspicious operations
that rarely occur in benign documents [44, 45, 61, 68]. Another line
of work statically extracts features of documents, e.g., based on a
document’s metadata and structure [47, 63, 65] or based on embed-
ded JavaScript [16, 41], and then trains a machine learning model to
identify malicious documents. Nissim et al. survey these and other
techniques [51]. Beyond PDFs, the problem of malicious documents
extends to other document formats [50]. A recurring problem for
all document scanners is how to evaluate them, particularly, in the
presence of evasions. Chameleon provides a generic mechanism to
create malicious documents beyond well-studied sets of documents,
such as the Contagio malware dump6.
JavaScript Analysis. Malicious PDF documents contain ma-
licious JavaScript code. Identifying such code has been actively
6http://contagiodump.blogspot.com/
researched for client-side web applications, by analyzing poten-
tial malware samples in a sandbox [72], through learning-based
anomaly detection [18], by classifying abstract syntax trees [19],
or by searching for malicious sites with specially crafted search en-
gine queries [34]. A recent survey discusses various other security-
related analyses of JavaScript code [4]. All these approaches fo-
cus on JavaScript code in web applications, which differs from
JavaScript code embedded in PDF documents.
From Logic Bombs to Modern Evasions. Attempts to fool
detectors of malicious software are probably as old as malicious
software itself. Earlier approaches use logic bombs, where an attack
is initiated upon occurrence of an external event [5, 28]. To counter
malware scanners that execute a potentially malicious file in a
virtualized environment, anti-virtualization techniques have been
proposed [57]. Chen et al. [13] provide a taxonomy of malware
evasion techniques with a focus on anti-virtualization and anti-
debugging behavior. Some of the evasions studied in this paper can
be used to detect a virtualized environment, while others, e.g., the
UI evasions, can also detect scanners running on a physical machine.
Transparent scanners try to mimic a real execution platform, i.e.,
without any traces of virtualization or specific fingerprints [38],
but even those can be evaded via evasion techniques that check the
system’s past use, e.g., via the Windows registry size or the total
number of browser cookies [48]. Several survey articles discuss
other evasion techniques [9, 15], including code transformation
techniques similar to our obfuscation evasions [77].
Evasions in Document-based Attacks. We envision future
work to extend our framework with additional evasions, e.g., PDF
parser confusion attacks [12]. Other recent evasion techniques fool
machine learning-based scanners, for instance by slightly mod-
ifying a benign document [46] or by stochastically modifying a
malicious document [20, 75]. Knowing that attackers might conceal
malicious behavior through evasions, Zhang et al. [78] propose
an approach to improve machine learning-based scanners through
adversary-aware feature selection. Finally, there are two previous
papers that systematically study the effectiveness of evasions. Big-
gio et al. [8] study to what extent learning-based malware classi-
fiers can be fooled by evasions. In contrast, we do not make any
assumptions about the studied scanners and (probably) include both
learning-based and not learning-based scanners. Laskov et al. [66]
focus on a single scanner (PDFRate), whereas our study involves
41 scanners.
8 CONCLUSION
This paper presents a methodology to evaluate the effectiveness of
evasions and its application to studying PDF malware scanners. Our
implementation of the methodology, the Chameleon framework, au-
tomatically generates and enriches malicious documents with one
or multiple evasions. We use these documents for an in-depth study
of 41 PDF scanners and how they are affected by evasions. More
broadly, our methodology can also be used for studying evasions
of other malware types, e.g., malicious executables.
The overall result of our study is cause for concern. We show
that the studied evasions are surprisingly effective in fooling state-
of-the-art scanners. In particular by combining evasions, attackers
can bypass modern defenses in both static and dynamic scanners.
Moreover, we find huge variations across scanners, enabling tar-
geted attacks based on evasions picked specifically for a targeted
scanner. All these findings are a call to arms for future work on
anti-evasion techniques.
Our work will support future efforts toward improving malware
scanners in several ways. First, the results of our study help security
vendors to better understand their vulnerability to specific evasions
and to focus their attention on mitigating the most effective eva-
sions. Second, we are releasing the corpus of malicious, evasive
documents generated by Chameleon as a ready-to-use benchmark.
We are in contact with several developers of PDF scanners, and
some of them, e.g., SploitGuard and SAFE-PDF, have already used
our benchmark to test and improve their security scanners. Finally,
the Chameleon framework provides a basis for expanding the set
of benchmarks by incorporating future evasions, exploits, and pay-
loads.
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A DETAILS ON PDF SCANNERS
A.1 Setup of Academic and Open-Source
Scanners
The following describes the academic and open-source scanners, i.e.,
Slayer, SAFE-PDF, PDF Scrutinizer, and Cuckoo Sandbox, and how
we set them up for our study. In addition, we briefly go through the
internals of SploitGuard, which, even though a commercial scanner,
is based on an academic work [54].
Slayer [47], also known as PDF Malware Slayer or PDFMS, is a
machine learning-based static scanner. It predicts whether a docu-
ment is malicious based on the document’s internal structure. We
train Slayer with a set of malicious and benign PDF files that are
obtained from Mila Parkour, the owner of Contagiodump7, a public
malware repository. The malicious sets comprises more than 11,000
files, which are labeled as ’MALWARE_PDF_CVEsorted_173_files’
and ’MALWARE_PDF_PRE_04-2011_10982_files’. The benign set
comprises 9,000 files labeled as ’CLEAN_PDF_9000_files’.
SAFE-PDF statically reasons about a file based on abstract inter-
pretation. It is designed to cope with malicious PDF documents that
incorporate evasions. By abstract interpretation, it over-approximates
the run-time behavior of a document to examine all its possible
execution paths.
PDF Scrutinizer [61] extracts all JavaScript code snippets from
a PDF document, executes the code in Mozilla Rhino, and uses
libemu to find and analyze the payload. The tool combines both
static and dynamic analysis techniques, but as more weight is put
on the dynamic part, we classify it as a dynamic scanner.
Cuckoo Sandbox [31] (in short Cuckoo) scores each analyzed
sample on a scale of 0 (benign) to 10 (certainly malicious). To map
this score into a binary score (malicious or not), which is necessary
to compare Cuckoo with other scanners, we set a threshold on the
score reported by Cuckoo. To this end, we scan documents with the
bare exploits, i.e., without any evasion, with Cuckoo and take the
minimum score among them, 3.0, as the maliciousness threshold.
We consider any score greater than or equal to this threshold as a
“malicious” classification, and any score smaller than the threshold
as “benign”. We evaluate Cuckoo out-of-the-box with no additional
extensions installed, except Cuckoo Signatures8, which are commu-
nity rules that assign score to observed behaviors (e.g., dropping
executable files). We configure Cuckoo’s guest machine with two
processors, 2 GB of memory, and one virtual monitor having 720p
resolution (important for “mons” and “resol” evasions). The guest
machine runs Windows 7, 64-bit, and has Adobe Reader 9.0, the
version vulnerable to our exploits, installed.
SploitGuard is a dynamic scanner based on Lockdown [54] that
detects the exploitation of vulnerabilities by enforcing different
policies during the execution of a program, for example Adobe
Reader. By design, SploitGuard does not need to be trained, and
the result for a given document is a binary decision “malicious” or
“benign”.
7http://contagiodump.blogspot.com/
8https://github.com/cuckoosandbox/community/
A.2 Other Considered Analyzers
We considered several other academic scanners but could not in-
clude all of them, because some are either not available or have
some issues in our local setup. The following is a list of scanners
that we considered but unfortunately could not include in our study.
• PDFRate [63]: A learning-based PDF scanner that decideswhether
a document is malicious based on its structure. PDFRate’s online
service9 was not available at the time of writing this paper.
• MDScan [68]: Combining static and dynamic analysis, MDScan
specifically targets PDF files. The dynamic analysis is via extract-
ing JavaScript snippets and running them on an emulator. The
source code for MDScan is not available in the public domain.
• Lux0r [16]: A machine learning approach aimed at detecting
malicious JavaScript code in general, but evaluated with mali-
cious JavaScript-bearing PDF documents. By tapping into the
JavaScript interpreter, Lux0r anticipates a malicious behavior
based on the API usage. Lux0r is not publicly available.
• MPScan [45]: MPScan extracts and de-obfuscates the JavaScript
code on the fly by hooking into Adobe Reader, and then statically
analyzes it to detect a malicious behavior. MPScan’s source code
is not publicly available.
• ShellOS [64]: Even-though designed mainly for executable files,
ShellOS can find the payload in a malicious PDF document and
analyze it too. However, the tool is not publicly available.
• The tool by Carmony et al. [12]: To improve the detection accu-
racy, Carmony et al. improve extraction of the JavaScript snippets
of a PDF document. The tool then uses PJScan [41] for classifica-
tion of the extracted snippets. The tool is not publicly available.
• CWXDetector [71]: By disabling data execution prevention (DEP),
CWXDetectormonitors the execution of code fromnon-executable
pages (former exploits usually tried to execute code from the heap,
which is non-executable). Once such a write happens, the page
fault handler is invoked and the page’s content is dumped for
further analysis. CWXDetector can be used for several file types
such as executable and PDF files. However, it is not available
online.
• Tool by Liu et al. [44]: By statically instrumenting a document
to insert context-monitoring code, the instrumented document’s
behavior is observed at run-time. The tool is not publicly avail-
able.
• PJScan [41]: A static scanner that uses machine learning to detect
malicious files. We tried to train PJScan10 with the same sets of
files used for training Slayer, but unfortunately, it did not find any
JavaScript code (even though most of the files contain embedded
JavaScript). Therefore it could not be trained and evaluated in
our setup.
• PlatPal [74]: Runs a PDF document in Adobe Reader and track
its behavior on Windows and macOS. Based on the discrepancies
in the execution traces (e.g. the amount of dynamically allocated
memory), it marks the document as either malicious or benign.
We hit compilation errors while trying to build the tool11 locally
and unfortunately the documentation did not help us to resolve
them.
9https://csmutz.com/pdfrate/
10https://sourceforge.net/p/pjscan/home/Home/
11https://github.com/sslab-gatech/platpal
